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Lawrence Schembri, International Department
he Bank of Canada’s tenth annual research
conference, held in November 2000, marked
the ﬁftieth anniversary of Canada’s adoption
of a ﬂexible exchange rate. For 43 of the past
51 years, Canada has had a ﬂoating rate. This is about
15 years longer than any other major industrialized
country over this period.1 Canada’s successful post-
war experience with a ﬂexible rate, especially its most
recent experience with a ﬂexible rate and inﬂation tar-
geting, has been a useful example for other industrial-
ized and emerging-market countries, including
Mexico and Brazil.
The title of the conference, “Revisiting the Case for
Flexible Exchange Rates,” also recognized the seminal
contribution of Professor Milton Friedman to
exchange rate theory. His classic article, “The Case for
Flexible Exchange Rates,” lucidly explains the critical
arguments in favour of a ﬂexible exchange rate and
provides the intellectual foundation for Canada’s ﬂex-
ible exchange rate regime.2 Many of these arguments
were re-examined in the papers presented at this con-
ference, using recent developments in economic the-
ory, as well as recent data and econometric techniques.
Friedman also made another more direct, but less
well-known, contribution to Canadian exchange rate
1.   Canada returned to the Bretton Woods ﬁxed exchange rate system on
2 May 1962, only to leave it for good on 31 May 1970. The other major
industrialized countries joined Canada by abandoning the pegged-rate
system in 1973. Canada’s early experience with a ﬂexible exchange rate, from
1950 to 1962, was often alluded to as an example of how well a ﬂoating rate
could work. Not only was it cited by Milton Friedman (1953), but it inspired
many academic papers and several PhD theses, including those by current
Federal Reserve presidents, William Poole (St. Louis) and Robert McTeer
(Dallas).
2.   Friedman’s article, which was published in 1953, ﬁrst appeared as a U.S.
government memorandum in the autumn of 1950.
T
policy when he participated in a radio debate on this
issue on 18 April 1948 with Bank of Canada Deputy
Governor Donald Gordon and W.A. Mackintosh, a
professor of economics at Queen’s University. During
the debate, Friedman argued that Canada’s direct
controls on imports should be replaced by a flexible
exchange rate because “[that] is the most effective way
of making [import] goods more expensive to Canadi-
ans and your export goods cheaper to other people . . .”
and “is it not better to let every individual decide
for himself what items he wants to curtail in [the] face
of higher prices than to have a government official doit
insome...across-the-board,roughmanner?”(Friedman,
Gordon, and Mackintosh 1948, 6).
Less than 18 months after the radio debate, on
30 September 1950, Douglas Abbott, Canada’s Minister
of Finance, announced that, “today the Government . . .
cancelled the ofﬁcial rates of exchange. . . . Instead,
rates of exchange will be determined by conditions of
supply and demand for foreign currencies in Canada.”
Friedman could not have written it any better.3
Half a century later, in the aftermath of the currency
crises of the 1990s and the formation of the European
Economic and Monetary Union, the debate on the
choice of exchange rate regime continues. The pur-
pose of this conference was to contribute to this debate
by re-examining the case for a ﬂexible exchange rate
(with some form of price-level or inﬂation target)
against the alternative of a more permanently ﬁxed
regime, such as a common currency, in light of new
theoretical and empirical developments. The papers
presented investigated the experiences of a wide
3. In his autobiography, Friedman claims that the radio discussion with Don-
ald Gordon “played a major role” in Canada’s adoption of a ﬂoating rate in
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range of emerging-market economies and of several
industrialized countries, including Canada.
The conference consisted of ﬁve sessions, a closing
panel discussion, and the keynote address. Two
papers were presented in each session: one by econo-
mists from the Bank of Canada, the other by outside
academics. These were followed by comments from
two designated discussants and questions from the
ﬂoor. Michael Bordo of Rutgers University, John Helli-
well of the University of British Columbia, and Rich-
ard Lipsey of Simon Fraser University were the
distinguished members of the closing panel. Nobel
Laureate Milton Friedman of the Hoover Institution
gave the keynote address by video conference from
StanfordUniversity.Friedmanandthepanelmembers
also took questions from the ﬂoor. Highlights of the
papers presented in each session are outlined here,
together with summaries of the panel discussion and
the keynote address.4
Session 1: Welfare Analysis
Much of the existing work comparing alternative
exchange rate regimes is qualitative and lacks formal
welfare analysis. The papers in this session attempted
to ﬁll this gap by employing dynamic general-equilib-
rium (DGE) models with explicit household welfare
functions and optimizing behaviour by households
and businesses.5 To generate differences in the out-
comes across the exchange rate regimes considered,
both papers assumed some form of wage or price
stickiness.
Tiff Macklem, Patrick Osakwe, Hope Pioro, and
Lawrence Schembri use a calibrated three-sector DGE
model of the Canadian economy (resources, manufac-
turing, and non-traded goods) to analyze the impact
of stochastic shocks to the terms of trade under alter-
native exchange rate and monetary policy regimes.
The two regimes considered are a ﬂexible exchange
rate with a price-level target, which is similar to
Canada’s current regime, and a permanently fixed
exchange rate such as that under a currency union.
The model explicitly incorporates the trade-off
between the macroeconomic stability gains of a ﬂexi-
ble exchange rate and the reduction in transactions
costs offered by a ﬁxed rate. Transactions costs in
international trade are endogenously determined in
4.  These summaries draw on summaries prepared by John Helliwell for the
closing panel.
5.  Moran (2000–2001) provides a recent survey of DGE models.
the model as a function of the variability of the ﬂexible
rate. Fifty per cent of consumers are assumed to be
credit-constrained, to reﬂect the fact that most agents
cannot borrow in world capital markets to smooth the
impact of exogenous shocks on their consumption.
The results indicate that Canada would gain more by
accommodating terms-of-trade shocks with a ﬂexible
exchange rate than it would by reducing transactions
costs through the choice of a currency union. This dif-
ference arises because terms-of-trade shocks produce
a variance in output that is almost 50 per cent greater
under ﬁxed than under ﬂexible exchange rates. In
addition, the authors ﬁnd that, for ﬁxed rates to domi-
nate ﬂexible exchange rates, the transactions costs
saved under a common currency would have to be
0.8 per cent of GDP or about four times greater than
commonly estimated. They also examine the sensitivity
of the results to increases in the degree of risk aversion
and to increases in the probability of large shocks. In
both cases, the welfare beneﬁt of a ﬂexible exchange
rate would increase. They argue that their model is
biased in favour of ﬁxed rates because it assumes that
the shocks have the same effect on all workers, when
in practice, the impact is very uneven. The results
would, however, be less supportive of ﬂexible rates if
Canada’s dependence on the production and export of
primary commodities were to decline in the future.
In his paper, Michael Devereux stresses the impor-
tance of the pricing behaviour of ﬁrms in the traded-
goods sector on the choice of exchange rate regimes.
In his model, the critical trade-off in the utility func-
tion is between the variability of inﬂation and output.
In his monopolistically competitive price-setting
framework, volatile inﬂation implies volatile markups
and thus large departures from the optimal outcome.
He argues that if ﬁrms in the traded-goods sector
practice pricing to market and thus prevent the imme-
diate pass-through of exchange rate movements into
domestic prices, then a ﬂexible exchange rate will
likely be preferred over a ﬁxed exchange rate system.
A ﬂexible exchange rate will reduce the variability of
output in the face of external shocks and will not sig-
niﬁcantly increase the volatility of inﬂation, if there is
limited exchange rate pass-through to domestic
prices. Devereux notes that exchange rate pass-
through is likely to be more prevalent in emerging
markets than in mature economies, making ﬂexible
rates a more attractive choice for mature economies
than for emerging-market economies. His model
incorporates a forward-looking Phillips curve, and he
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including a pegged exchange rate and two inﬂation-
targeting rules with ﬂexible exchange rates. With lim-
ited exchange rate pass-through, the ﬂexible exchange
rate rules produce higher welfare outcomes. Indeed,
targeting the price of non-traded goods rather than
the consumer price index basket is optimal.
Session 2: The Role of the Exchange
Rate in Adjustment and Integration
In choosing an exchange rate regime, it is important
to consider which regime best facilitates macroeco-
nomic adjustment and economic integration. A
flexible nominal exchange rate generally makes it
easier for the real exchange rate to adjust in the face
of exogenous shocks when prices or wages are sticky.
Conversely, ﬁxed exchange rates, especially in the
form of a currency union, encourage economic inte-
gration in terms of trade and factor flows among
countries by reducing the cost of international trans-
actions.
Ramdane Djoudad, Céline Gauthier, and Pierre St-
Amant address the issue of macroeconomic adjust-
ment by extending the structural vector autoregres-
sion (VAR) models of Dupasquier, Lalonde, and
St-Amant (1997) and Clarida and Galí (1994) to incor-
porate commodity prices in the Canada–U.S. case. The
motivation for including commodity prices in the
model was the ﬁnding by Amano and van Norden
(1993) that real commodity prices, primarily real non-
energy commodity prices, are statistically signiﬁcant
explanations of movements in the Canadian real
exchange rate. Using quarterly data for Canada and
the United States from 1973 to 1999 to estimate their
structural VAR model, the authors obtain several
important results. First, Canada’s ﬂexible nominal
exchange rate facilitates macroeconomic adjustment
by accelerating the realignment of the real exchange
rate. Second, including the real prices of primary
materials in the model does not change the key results
of earlier studies, which ﬁnd that most of the variation
in the real exchange rate and output is explained by
real demand shocks and supply shocks. Third, mone-
tary shocks do not play a large part in explaining
movements in the real exchange rate.
Andrew Rose examines the impact of common cur-
rencies on economic integration. By drawing on his
previous research and performing some new empiri-
cal work, he compares the economic integration of
countries within currency unions with the integration
of regions within a country and with integration
among countries with different currencies. In general,
he ﬁnds that countries within a currency union are
more integrated than non-currency-union countries,
but are much less integrated than regions within a
nation. Rose first considers the basic characteristics of
currency-union members; they are typically small and
poor countries and are more specialized than non-
members. He then examines trade flows, real exchange
rates, the synchronization of business cycles, and the
sharing of consumption risk. Using a large panel-data
set of over 150 countries at ﬁve-year intervals, he esti-
mates an equation that includes a wide range of control
variables and ﬁnds that trade is 340 per cent higher
among members of a currency union than among
non-members. Real exchange rate persistence is simi-
lar within and outside currency unions (i.e., the speed
of real exchange rate adjustment is virtually the same),
while real exchange rate volatility is lower within
currency unions, while still being much greater than
between cities within the same country. The business
cycles of countries within currency unions are more
synchronized than among countries not in currency
unions but much less synchronized than those of
regions within a single country. Finally, Rose asks
whether consumption correlations are higher within
currency unions; after controlling for synchronization
of output, he ﬁnds no signiﬁcant evidence of such an
effect. In conclusion, drawing on results from Frankel
and Rose (2000), he argues that the greater trade
integration of currency unions is important because
increased trade generates more output. As a caveat, he
notes that it would require a leap of faith to apply
these results, based on a sample of mainly small and
poor currency-union members, to larger, more devel-
oped countries, such as Canada or members of the
European Economic and Monetary Union.
Session 3: Exchange Rates, Currency
Markets, and Trade Flows
Flexible exchange rates are often criticized as being
excessively volatile. Indeed, some observers believe
that they are largely disconnected from macroeco-
nomic fundamentals. This supposed disconnection is
often used to justify central bank intervention in the
foreign exchange market because, on its own, the mar-
ket is unable to quickly return the exchange rate to its
equilibrium level. Moreover, this exchange rate vola-
tility is believed by many to have a significant dele-
terious impact on trade ﬂows.34 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2001
Ramdane Djoudad, John Murray, Tracy Chan, and
Jason Daw investigate the signiﬁcance of economic
fundamentals in determining exchange rate move-
ments in Canada as well as in Australia and New Zea-
land, two other major commodity-exporting
countries. They begin by extending the Amano-van
Norden (1993) error-correction model of the Canadian
exchange rate to New Zealand and Australia. This
model attempts toexplain bilateral real exchangerates
using non-energy commodity prices, energy prices,
and interest rate differentials. The authors estimate
these exchange rate models for all three countries
(Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) and obtain
similar results with good statistical ﬁts. They then use
these estimated exchange rate equations to approxi-
mate the behaviour of fundamentalist traders and
apply regime-switching techniques to distinguish
periods during which either chartists (technical trad-
ers) or fundamentalists dominate the foreign
exchange market. A number of different technical
trading rules are used to capture the behaviour of
chartists. The authors ﬁnd that on the more tranquil
trading days (which represent roughly 70 per cent of
all trading days), chartists dominate, while fundamen-
talists are more active during more turbulent times.
The authors maintain that these results suggest that
central bank intervention is not needed to help stabi-
lize markets, since sharp increments in the exchange
rates of the three countries are typically driven by fun-
damentalists pushing these currencies back to their
equilibrium values. Finally, they argue that changes in
monetary conditions caused by exchange rate move-
ments should not necessarily be resisted by policy-
makers because such exchange rate movements usu-
ally reﬂect changes in the underlying fundamentals.
Philippe Bacchetta and Eric van Wincoop develop a
theoretical general-equilibrium model with multiple
sources of uncertainty to analyze the relationship
between trade ﬂows and ﬂuctuations in the nominal
exchange rate. In general, this relationship is ambigu-
ous, but because it depends on the pricing behaviour
of exporting ﬁrms, the authors ﬁrst determine the
optimal pricing strategy between producer currency
pricing and local currency pricing (also known as
pricing to market). They ﬁnd that under reasonable
parameter values, most ﬁrms would price to market
because it reduces risk by stabilizing sales volumes.
They also show that once the pricing strategy is set, a
ﬂuctuating ﬂexible exchange rate reduces trade only if
exporting ﬁrms practice pricing to market because
exchange rate ﬂuctuations will directly affect their
revenue in their own currency. Whether or not trade is
reduced in general depends on household preferences
between consumption and leisure, monetary policy,
and the extent of pricing to market. Their model pre-
dicts that as asset markets become more complete,
ﬁrms will hedge their risks directly and move away
from pricing-to-market behaviour. Thus, the inﬂuence




Fluctuating nominal exchange rates may create uncer-
tainty over the longer term, and this uncertainty may
reduce investment because it worsens the risk-return
trade-off and encourages investors to put off their
investments. Lower investment levels reduce labour
productivity and, potentially, total or multifactor pro-
ductivity because new technology is often embedded
in new capital. In addition, McCallum (1999), among
others, has argued that a depreciating nominal
exchange rate will hurt productivity because it dulls
the incentive to invest in productivity-enhancing
improvements in physical, human, and research and
development capital.6 This argument, however,
ignores the fact that most sustained movements in the
nominal exchange rate are shifts in the underlying real
exchange rate that would have occurred regardless of
the exchange rate regime. The papers in this session
examine the effect of exchange rate movements on
investment and productivity in Canada.
Robert Lafrance and David Tessier investigate the
effect of exchange rate variability on investment in
Canada. They distinguish between the effects that
may be caused by the potential misalignment of the
exchange rate level and those that may result from the
volatility of the exchange rate. The authors use
Granger causality tests to investigate both types of
effects and ﬁnd that neither the misalignment of levels
nor the volatility of the bilateral real exchange rate
affects total domestic investment spending, invest-
ment in machinery and equipment, or foreign direct
investment. They do ﬁnd an effect from the level of
the real exchange rate to the level of investment, but
this disappears if the level of proﬁts is controlled for
by including it as a third variable in the test.
Richard Harris argues that the recent depreciation of
the nominal exchange rate in Canada has had a nega-
tive impact on Canadian productivity. He notes that
6.   Lafrance and Schembri (1999–2000) examine the “lazy manufacturers”
argument more closely and ﬁnd numerous faults.35 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2001
although most theory would predict that exchange
rate depreciations should raise demand, factor utiliza-
tion, measured productivity, and investment, the
reverse has been true for Canada. Based partly on
work by Michael Porter (1990), Harris maintains that
real depreciations, by sheltering inefﬁcient industries
and raising input costs, lead to lower productivity.
The interesting questions, in his view, relate to the
nature of the channels or mechanisms through which
productivity is reduced and the size of the effects. He
identiﬁes three mechanisms: relative factor costs, a
gap in innovation, and a slowdown in creative
destruction. The 1990s saw steady increases in the rel-
ative price of machinery and equipment to wages in
Canada compared with the United States. Hence, over
the 1990s, investment per hour worked grew substan-
tially in the United States relative to Canada. The link
between an innovation gap and the exchange rate is
more difﬁcult to discern. Harris argues that the nomi-
nal exchange rate depreciation increased the relative
price of new technology and of technology workers,
encouraging ﬁrms to shift away from technology-pro-
ducing activities. Finally, he maintains that the depre-
ciation also allowed marginally proﬁtable small ﬁrms
to survive in Canada when ﬁrms with similar low
proﬁt margins were forced out of business in the
United States. Using panel data on 14 OECD countries
over the period 1970–97, Harris ﬁnds that recent
exchange rate depreciations actually increase labour
productivity but that longer-term deviations from
purchasing-power parity (as a measure of misalign-
ment) worsen it, both by relatively small amounts.
Session 5: Implications for Emerging-
Market Economies
In the wake of the collapse of many pegged exchange
rate regimes in the 1990s, there has been an important
ongoing debate as to the appropriate exchange rate
regime for emerging-market countries. A consensus
seems to have emerged that ultimately these countries
should choose either a ﬂexible rate or some form of
credibly ﬁxed exchange rate regime. Two questions
remain unanswered, however: which of the two
extremes is appropriate, and how to get there. The
papers in this session addressed these issues.
Jeannine Bailliu, Robert Lafrance, and Jean-François
Perrault examine the relationship between the
exchange rate regime and the growth rate in emerg-
ing-market economies. They also develop a method
for classifying exchange rate regimes based on the
observed degree of exchange rate ﬂexibility. By means
of multivariate regression, they test several hypothe-
ses linking growth and exchange rate regimes for a
sample of 25 developing countries, using data over
the period 1973–98. They ﬁnd that ﬂexible exchange
rate regimes are associated with higher growth for
countries that are open to capital movements. This
result also holds for countries with well-developed
ﬁnancial markets, but the positive effect of a ﬂexible
exchange rate on growth is not as strong. When other
variables are held constant, changes in the exchange
rate regime are also found to be associated with lower
growth, probably because many of the changes that
occurred in this sample of emerging-market countries
involved the collapse of a ﬁxed exchange rate.
Guillermo Calvo and Carmen Reinhart emphasize
the gap between announced and actual exchange rate
regimes. After the collapse of pegged exchange rate
regimes in emerging-market economies in the 1990s,
many of the affected countries, such as Mexico and
those in East Asia, announced the adoption of ﬂoating
or managed ﬂoating exchange rate regimes. Although
ofﬁcial data from the International Monetary Fund
show a large movement towards more flexible exchange
rate regimes (Fischer 2001), Calvo and Reinhart argue
that these regime descriptions are misleading, since
many of the countries described as ﬂoaters do not, in
fact, allow their currencies to ﬂoat because they fear
the impact of exchange rate ﬂuctuations on their econ-
omies. Analyzing a sample of more than 150 exchange
rate arrangements, the authors ﬁnd that many ﬂoaters
have quite stable exchange rates and show considera-
ble movements in reserves and interest rates because
they are intervening to stabilize their exchange rates.
They argue that the main reason that these countries
want a stable exchange rate is that large proportions
of ofﬁcial and private debt are denominated in foreign
currencies. Thus, a depreciating real exchange rate, for
example, may actually be contractionary, not expan-
sionary, because it may create severe ﬁnancial prob-




Michael Bordo reviewed the history of Canadian mon-
etary regimes from 1820 to 2000. Over this period,
Canada has experienced alternating ﬁxed and ﬂoating
regimes.Bordo’sremarksfocusedonthedeterminants
of these regimes. For most of the early part of this
period, Canada was a follower. It went along with the
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time, which Bordo characterized as a gold convertibil-
ity contingency rule—a ﬁxed convertibility rule
between currency and gold with an escape clause that
would allow convertibility to be suspended when
warranted; e.g., World Wars I and II. He views the
ﬂexible exchange rate period 1950–62 as an escape-
clause period rather than the beginning of a new era,
and looks on the return to the ﬁxed rate from 1962–70
as a return to the status quo. The new era began in the
early 1970s with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
system and the adoption of a ﬁat, rather than a com-
modity, standard with ﬂoating rates by most Western
industrializedcountries.Canada’sadoptionofexplicit
inﬂation targets in 1991, and their adoption by several
other industrialized countries at the same time, can be
interpreted as a new policy rule. Bordo calls it the
domestic convertibility principle, which is similar to
the convertibility principle that existed under the gold
standard, because, with low inﬂation, the domestic
currency is convertible into the domestic consumption
basket at an almost ﬁxed rate.
Richard Lipsey
Richard Lipsey organized his remarks around ﬁve
issues raised by the papers presented. First, he noted
that, to be taken seriously, critics of the current ﬂexible
exchange rate regime in Canada cannot simply list its
faults but must fully articulate a feasible alternative
regime. Second, useful criticisms of the current regime
must compare its costs with those of an alternative
regime. Third, the Bank of Canada’s exchange rate
equation may ﬁt well, but it is not well understood.
The negative sign on the energy-price variable, as well
as the absence of U.S. variables in a bilateral exchange
rate equation, is a puzzle that needs to be explained.
Fourth, although most of the evidence put forward at
this conference seems to indicate that Canada is best
served by a ﬂexible exchange rate, Andrew Rose’s
results appear to be at odds with this conclusion.
Nonetheless, Lipsey believes that neither Rose’s ﬁnd-
ings, nor those of Calvo and Reinhart, apply to Can-
ada, primarily because their samples of countries and
time periods are not representative of the current eco-
nomic situation in Canada. Finally, regarding produc-
tivity and technological change, the paper by Bailliu,
Lafrance, and Perrault makes a useful contribution to
the investigation of how exchange rate regimes affect
economic growth, but the case is not closed. The paper
by Richard Harris raises more questions than it
answers, but should not be dismissed out of hand
because in a world of uncertainty, nominal variables
such as the exchange rate regime could have an
impact on real outcomes by affecting the path that the
economy takes.
John Helliwell
John Helliwell’s comments were a series of remarks
on the various papers. He notes that much of the
research presented at the conference ﬁnds systematic
advantages of ﬂexible exchange rates over ﬁxed.
Indeed, the welfare difference for Canada is surpris-
ingly large. The puzzling negative sign on the energy-
price variable in the Bank of Canada’s exchange rate
equation probably reﬂects the fact that the U.S. dollar
is the currency preferred by major oil exporters for
investment. Intervention in the Canadian foreign
exchange market is often in the form of changes in
monetary policy. Since these changes in interest rates
are incorporated into the Bank’s equation, it is mis-
leading to argue that intervention is not needed
because the fundamentals, as speciﬁed by the equa-
tion, will drive the market back to equilibrium. One
way of interpreting the ﬁndings of Andrew Rose on
the effect of a common currency on trade is to con-
clude that the right countries have joined currency
unions, not that this result is a prescription for other
countries. In other words, the causality may run from
large trade ﬂows to a common currency, not the other
way around. Moreover, the Frankel and Rose results
on the impact of currency unions on trade and then on
growth are too large to be credible. Richard Harris’s
ﬁndings linking departures from purchasing-power
parity to declines in productivity are misleading,
because shifts in the terms of trade simultaneously
reduce the value of output and, hence, productivity,
and cause ﬂexible exchange rates to depart from pur-
chasing-power parity. Finally, national markets for
goods, services, labour, and capital are more seg-
mented than economists typically believe—border
effects are surprisingly large—yet this does not seem
to signiﬁcantly reduce welfare in small economies.
Levels of GDP per capita across industrialized coun-
tries are not very different. Moreover, this segmenta-
tion of national markets, although not fully under-
stood, strengthens the case for ﬂexible rates.
Keynote Address, Milton Friedman
Milton Friedman began his remarks by noting that
the last time he had extensive contact with the Bank
of Canada was in 1948 in the radio debate with
Deputy Governor Donald Gordon, and that this was
probably the ﬁrst time Donald Gordon had heard a
serious defence of a flexible exchange rate. He noted37 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2001
that Canada’s initial experience with a ﬂexible
exchange rate over the period 1950–60 was a good
one, in the sense that there was some ﬂuctuation but
no crises, and that speculation appeared to be stabiliz-
ing. Canada’s return to a ﬁxed rate in 1962 provided a
very instructive experience because the chain of policy
mistakes began roughly two years earlier with the
combination of bad monetary policy under Governor
James Coyne and a market-determined ﬂoating
exchange rate. After Coyne resigned, the Canadian
government decided to force a competitive deprecia-
tion rather than correct monetary policy. In so doing,
they created a speculative run against the Canadian
dollar, which they ﬁnally stopped with a pegged
exchange rate and massive intervention in the
opposite direction. Canada ﬂoated again in 1970 to
stem inﬂationary pressure coming from the United
States, and over the next 30 years experienced easier
monetary policy than the United States, which caused
roughly half of the Canadian dollar’s nominal depre-
ciation. Nonetheless, because of its ﬂexible exchange
rate, Canada never experienced a crisis over this
period like those that occurred in various countries
in the 1990s. Such crises are always and everywhere
caused by pegged exchange rates.
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